Principle of Liberty or Harm Principle? by Cavalieri, Paola
Principle of Liberty 
or Harm Principle? 
Paola Cavalieri 






In the framework of Western democracies, the 
movement for the prevention of cruelty to animals has 
been seen, ever since it dawned, as a lobby-a pressure 
group born to defend some spiritual inclinations, or 
subsidiary preferences, of some members of the political 
community. In the first case, the most suitable 
comparison is with a religious sect, or with a moralizing 
organization; in the second one, with some association 
of a more or less corporate nature. Still now, every 
time an opportunity for debate arises, people take care 
to present "impartially" the relevant views; here the 
animals' advocates, there the butchers, the furriers, the 
experimenters. In the democratic game, every lobby 
must get its due. 
This does not happen by accident. There is in our 
societies a particular class of criminal actions called 
"morals offenses." It has been noticed l that, since 
murder, e. g., is also an offense against morals, such a 
definition cannot be interpreted but in a restrictive sense, 
and that "morals offenses" are therefore only those 
crimes which impair nothing but morals. In fact, it is 
to the absence of an injured party that the other relevant 
expression, "victimless crimes," is related. Adultery, 
sodomy, incest and prostitution are the main examples; 
yet, the class also includes nonsexual offenses. One of 
these is cruelty to animals. 
The view that the rationale of the law could be, in 
addition to the protection ofone individual from another, 
also the punishment of "moral wickedness", has been 
called "legal moralism."2 Henceforth, I shall use the 
term "morality" to refer to the corpus of beliefs and 
customs that are allegedly impaired by the "victimless 
crimes" and that legal moralism aims to defend; and 
the term "morals" to mean what is covered by the laws 
intended to protect one individual from another. In this 
sense, rape can be defined as a crime against morals, 
while homosexual relations between consenting adults 
can be-and often is-considered a crime against 
morality. Legal moralism, usually endorsed by 
conservatives, is criticized by liberals. The view that it 
may be possible to defend by legal, or else social, 
sanctions the conformity to a particular code ofbehavior 
that is shared by the majority at a certain time seems 
unacceptable to those for whom the memory of the 
Inquisition is raised by the contemporary revival of 
religious fanaticism. 
Thus, if the crimes against animals fall within the 
victimless crimes, i. e., the crimes against morality, the 
reaction against the movement for the defense of 
animals becomes explainable. The tolerance of the 
lobby is acceptable, or better, right, in a liberal society. 
If, however, the new sect becomes too aggressive, and 
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tries to enforce its positions through argued personal 
and political requests and, if possible, also through the 
law, the charge of legal moralism, or rather, of 
Khomeinism (where the term is to be understood as: 
the highest conceivable level of zealotry) makes a 
sudden appearance. Those who champion the cause of 
animals would therefore be reactionary, while those who 
defend the status quo would be progressive; and those 
who require, e. g., that we stop eating meat are 
comparable to the followers of a religious creed who 
ask for the abolition of every other religion, or to 
orthodox heterosexuals who ask for the prohibition of 
homosexual relations. 
The argument seems plausible, but it isn't. In fact, 
it begs the question-it assumes just what it should 
demonstrate. That the crimes against animals are 
equivalent to the crimes against morality, that they are 
in fact crimes against morality, must be argued. One 
cannot simply assume it, let alone rely upon the fact 
that it is so according to the laws in force. The existence 
of societies which condemn association between white 
and colored people as immoral and punish it by law 
still leaves the question to be argued; as it has been 
emphasized, this is where the argument begins, not 
where it ends.3 
It is therefore worth surveying the shared framework 
of the defenders of the status quo. The very concept of 
victimless crimes clearly reveals that such a definition 
makes sense only in connection with the idea that, 
paradigmatically, crimes have victims. The charge of 
zealotry presupposes a view which is quite familiar to 
liberal theory and is usually associated with the so-called 
"Mill's principle."4 So, by choosing as a ground for 
discussion this middle-level principle-which is 
compatible with different substantive positions-not 
only do we not start from debatable premises, but in 
fact we resort to an ad hominem argument. 
Mill's principle, expounded and justified in the short 
treatise On Liberty, is, so to speak, a two-sided coin. 
Toward the end of the volume Mill summarizes in two 
maxims: "(These) maxims are, first, that the individual 
is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as 
these concern the interests of no person but himself. 
Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other 
people if though necessary by them for their own good, 
are the only measures by which society can justifiably 
express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. 
Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the 
interests of others, the individual is accountable, and 
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may be subjected either to social or to legal punish-
ment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other 
is requisite for its protection.',5 These two sides of the 
coin originated the two denominations which are used 
for the principle: principle of liberty (and not of 
tolerance, as some are paternalistically prone to say), 
and harm-to-others principle. 
On Liberty raised countless discussions. There 
have been, of course, radical critics who rejected the 
very principle, either by arguing that there are good 
reasons for compelling conformity to social morality 
and for punishing diversions from it even when these 
do not involve harm to others or by maintaining that 
since "no man is an island," it is practically impossible 
to identify classes of action which harm no one but 
the individual who performs them. Yet, the debate 
concentrated to a considerable degree on clarification 
and specification. Besides, those who accepted the 
principle on its general terms usually focused their 
attention on the second side of the coin, since the area 
of the first one, ruled by principle of liberty, coincides 
with the space that the harm principle does not cover, 
and expands or narrows according to the inter-
pretations of the latter. 
"(T)he only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others."6 Of this concise fonnulation, in which Mill 
summed up the harm principle, there are in particular 
two elements that lend themselves to analysis: the 
concept of "harm" and the concept of "others." As to 
what should be meant by "harm," the discussion was 
lively; apart from the basic distinction between private 
and public harm, the concept has been qualified in 
quite different ways as for its extension, and has 
included, among other notions, the ones of hurt, 
offense and nonbenefit. In contrast, the concept of 
"others" received less attention. The other has long 
been taken for granted-"other" was, generically, 
every human being. Apart from the issue of 
paternalistic intervention, where the individual who 
would be protected is the same that causes the harm, 
and which is the main target for Mill's darts ("Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual 
is sovereign"?), the question of the recipient of the 
harm has not been regarded as especially relevant till 
not long ago. Recently, however, the importance 
acquired by a particular ethical dispute has brought it 
to the forefront. 
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In Practical Ethics, Peter Singer writes: 
Mill's view is often and properly quoted in 
support of the repeal of laws that create 
"victimless crimes"-like the laws prohibiting 
homosexual relations between consenting 
adults, the use of marijuana and other drugs, 
prostitution, gambling and so on. Abortion is 
often included in this list.. .. Those who 
consider abortion a victimless crime say that, 
while everyone is entitled to hold and act on 
her own view about the morality of abortion, 
no section of the community should try to force 
others to adhere to its own particular view. In 
a pluralist society, we should tolerate others 
with different moral views and leave the 
decision to have an abortion up to the woman 
concerned. The fallacy involved in numbering 
abortion among victimless crimes should be 
obvious. The dispute about abortion is, largely, 
a dispute about whether or not abortion does 
have a 'victim' ....To use [Mill's] principle as 
a means of avoiding the difficulties of 
resolving the ethical dispute over abortion is 
to take it for granted that abortion does not 
harm an 'other'-which is precisely the point 
that needs to be proven before we can 
legitimately apply the principle to the case 
of abortion."g 
As far as abortion is concerned, this idea is shared 
by almost all moral philosophers, who therefore focus 
their attention on the moral status of the fetus. But let 
us try to substitute the issue, e. g., of the righmess of 
meat-eating for the rightness of abortion, and the subject 
"nonhuman animals" for the subject "fetus," and we 
shall realize that the problem is the same. The fact that 
most people do not take it into consideration doesn't 
modify the situation. It is true that throughout our 
cultural history the "animal question" has been rarely 
put forward and even more rarely, if ever, taken 
seriously. But from the beginning of the Seventies, the 
ethical reflection which has given rise to the corpus of 
the philosophy of animal liberation has radically 
changed the situation, as it has challenged the 
assumption that the factual differences between us and 
the other animals can automatically be turned into moral 
inequalities, and thus into a difference in trcatment.9 
Today, simply saying that when animals are concerned, 
Summer 1991 163 
one should not try to force others to follow one's own 
view of morality, is no longer possible. Before taking 
any position we must set, and seriously face, the problem 
of the moral status of nonhumans. 
The resistances which such an approach come up 
against are remarkable. The tendency to merely neglect 
the members of other species is so deep-rooted in us 
that even John Stuart Mill, who as a utilitarian defended 
the view that animals are part of the moral community 
to a degree,lO is not free from it. And this even in On 
Liberty. In fact, while discussing liberty in the religious 
sphere, he cites, as a case among others, the prohibition 
against eating pork in force among Mussulmans; and, 
as he considers whether it be acceptable to forbid non-
Mussulmans as well to consume it within the borders 
of an Islamic country, he concludes: "The only tenable 
ground of condemnation would be, that with the 
personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of 
individuals the public has no business to interfere."ll 
The problem of the possible violation of the interests 
of the animals raised for food is not even taken into 
consideration, and the question seems to be tackled 
exactly on the terms till now submitted to criticism. 
The case of Mill is surprising because it is 
contradictory. Other cases are so on different grounds. 
In that semblance of a trial against Rumanian dictator 
Nicolae Ceausescu the proceedings of which were 
divulged by the press all over the world, the man who 
plays the part of the prosecutor enumerates to the 
accused his crimes against the people: among the major 
charges there is the fact that, under his regime, the 
people could not eat meat. The complete moral 
irrelevance of those who are not human is so natural 
that, at the very beginning of a revolution against an 
absolute power, the possibility of wielding the most 
absolute power over animals is vindicated as an 
infringed right. 
We are still far from the moment when these events 
will bewilder the general public. However, I believe 
that the arguments in favor of the inclusion of animals 
in the sphere of moral equality are stronger than the 
traditional arguments in favor of their exclusion, and 
that, if the field of discussion remains that of rational 
ethics, sooner or later we shall have to acknowledge 
that animals are "others"-that in their case differences 
cannot be mechanically turned into inequalities. Should 
it so happen, we shall also admit that, when relations 
with non humans are involved, we are on the 
"protective" side of the coin-the one that is covered 
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by the harm-principle, and not the one covered by the 
principle of liberty. 
This way would follow the direction of ethical 
progress as it is conceived by William E. H. Lecky when 
he describes the moral community as an expanding 
circle, which embraces first the family, then a class, 
then a nation, then all humanity, and finally the animal 
world.12 Lecky himself gives a particularly significant 
example of the changes which have already occurred: 
"The gladiatorial games form, indeed, the one feature 
of Roman society which to a modem mind is almost 
inconceivable in its atrocity. That not only men, but 
women, in an advanced period ofcivilization-men and 
women who not only professed, but very frequently 
acted upon a high code of morals-should have made 
the carnage of men their habitual amusement, that all 
this should have continued for centuries, with scarcely 
a protest, is one of the most startling facts in moral 
history."13 I do not think it necessary to develop the 
analogy further. 
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